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1. INTRODUCTION
The scarcity of water resources in both arid and temperate countries alike
is one of the most pervasive natural resource allocation problems facing
water users and policy-makers. In arid countries this problem is faced each
day in the myriad of conflicts that surround its use. Water scarcity is a fact
with which all countries have to become increasingly involved.
Water scarcity occurs across many dimensions. First, there is growing
demand for water in residential, industrial and agricultural sectors stem-
ming largely from population and economic growth. Secondly, supply-side
augmentation options have become increasingly constrained and restric-
tively costly in many countries. In combination, demand growth and
supply-side interventions have stretched current water availability to its
hydrological limits. In addition to these quantity constraints, the limits to
the assimilative capacity of water resources for human and industrial waste
have been reached in many places, and the quality of freshwater has been
degraded (Winpenny, 1994).
In turn, water scarcity has become an important constraint on economic
development, which has resulted in fierce competition for scarce water
resources between economic sectors that rely upon it (Winpenny, 1994;
World Bank/EIB, 1990). Water scarcity is important for sustainability in
economic development as well, on account of the many associated envir-
onmental/watershed services. In the face of hydrological constraints, the
focus of current thinking in water resource management is on the alloca-
tion of scarce water between competing demands (Dublin Conference,
1992; UKWIR, 1999; Winpenny, 1994).
How is it possible to allocate water between its many competing uses, all
of which depend on water for their existence? Clearly, water resources are
necessities for many of the most important goals of every society. First,
water is a necessity for human existence. The absence of clean drinking
water and sanitation leads to health problems, whilst the lack of access
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to/property rights for water resources per se is a significant dimension of
poverty. Water is also an important input to economic activities and can
be seen as both a production and consumption good (Young, 1996).
Furthermore, water is a public good contributing to recreation, amenity
and general environmental and watershed values as an input to ecosystems
and habitats. How can it be possible to balance such crucially important,
but competing uses?
The fact is that a balancing of these uses must be accomplished, and
the mechanism for doing so must be carefully constructed. The existing
overlay of complex hydrological, socio-economic and property rights/legal
environments (in many if not most jurisdictions) predisposes water
resources to open access appropriation within the watershed and the con-
sequence of negative environmental and economic externalities (for
example, the degradation of wetlands and coastal fisheries, depletion of
aquifers and loss of watershed services). In short, the combination of the
arbitrariness of the prevailing property rights structure for water
resources in most jurisdictions and the failure of markets to capture the
value of many watershed services necessarily imply that the prevailing
distribution of water within most societies is not likely to be the most
desirable one.
In what follows, a ‘watershed economics approach’ is proposed which is
composed of two important stages. In the first stage, economic valuation
techniques are used to establish the economic value of the competing
demands for surface and groundwater, incorporating where necessary an
analysis of water quality. The valuation exercise allows the balancing of
demands based upon the equi-marginal principle to achieve economic
eﬃciency. In the second stage, a policy impact analysis is proposed,
which addresses issues of social equity and the value of water for envir-
onmental/ecological purposes. The analysis is undertaken within the con-
fines of the watershed, the most natural unit for the analysis of water
allocation and scarcity since it determines the hydrological links between
competing users and thus the impacts of one user upon another. The
methodology is encapsulated by a case study of the Kouris watershed
in Cyprus.
The methodology described here and the case study which accompanies
it provide an example of how CBA of water policy can be structured in the
context of the watershed. They show how the multifarious constraints
faced by watershed managers and policy-makers can be usefully evaluated
and traded oﬀ using the principles of CBA and the important consider-
ations of environment linkages and equity.
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2. METHODOLOGY
In this section we outline the methodology we propose for application to
the underlying problem of watershed management. This methodology is
based on (1) the identification of the appropriate unit for management;
(2) the agreement of the objectives of water allocation; (3) the evaluation
of the various attributes of water demand within that unit; (4) the identifi-
cation of optimal water resource allocations relative to objectives; and
(5) the assessment of the impacts of the proposed reallocation.
2.1 The Appropriate Management Unit
The watershed is a natural unit of analysis for addressing the balance of
supply and demand for water, and the issues of eﬃciency, equity and sus-
tainability, for a number of reasons. First, the aggregate availability of
water resources, including sustainable yields is bounded by the hydrological
cycle of the watershed. Second, the interaction between diﬀerent water
sources (for example, groundwater and surface water) is confined by the
watershed. Third, the demands for water interact within the watershed and
the hydrological impacts of one water user upon another and upon envir-
onment, that is, externalities, are defined by the watershed. For these
reasons, an understanding of the hydrological cycle in the watershed area
in question is a prerequisite for the determination of eﬃcient, equitable and
sustainable water resource allocation.
2.2 The Objectives of Water Allocation
Given the natural water resource constraints, there is a clear need to address
the pattern and growth of water demands in order to address the imbal-
ance. The methodology proposed provides the policy-maker and planner
with a transparent approach to balancing the competing demands for water
subject to the natural constraints. The approach is based on the compari-
son of the economic value of water in diﬀerent sectors, in terms of quan-
tity and quality, in comparable units of measurement. The overall objective
of public policy is to maximize societal welfare from a given natural
resource base subject to those valuations. The key objectives of public
policy in the allocation of resources are as follows:
● Eﬃciency. Economic eﬃciency is defined as an organization of pro-
duction and consumption such that all unambiguous possibilities for
increasing economic well-being have been exhausted (Young, 1996).
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For water, this is achieved where the marginal social benefits of water
use are equated to the marginal social cost of supply, or for a given
source, where the marginal social benefits of water use are equated
across users.
● Equity. Social welfare is likely to depend upon the fairness of dis-
tribution of resources and impacts across society, as well as eco-
nomic eﬃciency. Equal access to water resources, the distribution of
property rights, and the distribution of the costs and benefits of
policy interventions are examples of equity considerations for water
policy.
● Environment and sustainability. The sustainable use of water resources
has become another important aspect in determining the desirable
allocation of water from the perspective of society. Consideration of
intergenerational equity and the critical nature of ecological services
provided by water resources provide two rationales for considering
sustainability. In addition, the in situ value and public good nature of
water resources should enter into water allocation decisions.
2.3 The Evaluation of Water Demand
For physical, social and economic reasons, water is a classic non-marketed
resource. Even as a direct consumption good, market prices for water are
seldom available or, when observable, often are subject to biases such as
subsidies, taxes and so on. Similarly, environmental and ecological water
values are rarely explicitly marketed and priced. Thus the economic value of
water resources is seldom observed directly. The balancing of demands to
resolve the resource conflicts described above requires the identification and
comparison of the benefits and costs of water resource development and
allocation among alternative and competing uses. In addition, water man-
agement policies have widespread eﬀects on the quantity and quality of
water within a watershed and the timing and location of supplies for both in-
and oﬀ-stream uses. In general, these impacts have an economic dimension,
either positive or negative, which must be taken into account in policy
formulation. Again, the value of these impacts is seldom observed directly.
Fortunately, economists have refined a number of techniques to value
water resources and address the balance of demands and evaluate the
impacts of water management policy. The first step towards the evaluation
of economic benefits requires the identification of the demands for the
resource. Water is needed for all economic and social activities, so the evalu-
ator is faced with the problem of identifying a multi-sectoral demand curve.
The dimensions of demand include municipal and industrial, agricultural,
tourism and environmental (recreation, amenity and ecological).
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The valuation of each of the identified demands usually calls for a
diﬀerent approach for the following main reasons:
● the specific economic and hydrological context;
● data availability; and
● because the use of the resource is sector specific.
The residential and tourist sectors exploit the use value of water and use it
as a consumption good. The agricultural sector derives use value from
water as an input in production. The value of water related environmental
goods can be a use value or a non-use value, including so-called existence
value.
The valuation techniques allow the estimation of the following desirable
parameters:
● Marginal value of water. The eﬃcient balance of demands from a
given source is found where the marginal value (benefit) of water is
equated across users. In any given context, eﬃciency is achieved
where the marginal value of water is equated to marginal social cost.
● Price elasticity of demand (PED). This measures the responsiveness
of demand to price changes. It characterizes the demand function
and tells the policy-maker the extent to which prices must change
to cause demand to fall to a particular (for example, eﬃcient or
sustainable) level.
● Income elasticity of demand (IED). This measures the extent to
which the demand for water varies with income. It tells the policy-
maker whether water is a necessity or a luxury good and provides one
way in which to assess the fairness of pricing policies. In combination
with PED, IED can be used to estimate welfare changes resulting
from policies.
● Marginal or average willingness to pay for public goods (WTP). This
estimates the strength of demand for water as an environmental
good. This determines in part the eﬃcient environmental allocation
of water.
● Marginal willingness to pay for quality changes of common access
resources. This parameter estimates the value of quality attributes of
the resource, which are particularly important if the resource is used
as a productive input.
● Risk parameters. Measurement of preferences towards risk and
uncertainty. Useful for establishing policies, which reduce the impacts
of risk on consumer groups occasioned by reason of variability in
water availability.
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2.4 Balancing Water Demands in the Watershed
The outputs of the demand analysis allow the determination of the eco-
nomically eﬃcient allocations of water resources. The first element of an
economically eﬃcient allocation is the equi-marginal principle. This pre-
scribes that each use of the water resource should achieve the same benefit
from that water at the margin. In short, if water is more heavily valued at
the margin in one sector than another, then it should be reallocated towards
that sector until equality is achieved. The second element of the econom-
ically eﬃcient allocation is that aggregate water resources are allocated
eﬃciently where the marginal social benefit of their use is equated to the
marginal social cost of supply.
One option for achieving an economically eﬃcient water allocation is
the use of the instrument of water pricing, where water is uniformly and
universally charged at the marginal social cost of supply. This has the
following implications. First, competing demands will each make use of the
supply until its marginal benefit is equated with marginal social costs of
supply (the equi-marginal principle). Note that this implies that every use
must receive an equal marginal benefit from water resources in the
optimum. The second implication is that aggregate demand for water will
expand until the marginal benefit is equated with the marginal social cost
of supply (aggregate eﬃciency). Demand is hence endogenous and
managed within this model. The third implication is that the key to the
success of the policy is the determination of the appropriate marginal
social cost of supply and the marginal benefits to environmental uses.
2.5 Deriving Policies from the Methodologies – Policy Impact Analysis
There is a second phase to the water allocation methodology that follows
from the consideration of the implementation of the conclusions from the
first. The discussion here has largely been phrased in terms of the use of
water pricing as the appropriate allocation mechanism, but this need not
necessarily be the best or most appropriate instrument for allocating water
in every context. There are many diﬀerent approaches to enable the eﬃcient
allocation of water resources – pricing, marketable permits, even auctions
(Dinar, 1996; Easter et al., 1999; Winpenny, 1994). Ultimately, the particu-
lar context must be considered for the feasibility of the various instruments,
and the policy-maker must determine the most appropriate allocation
mechanism within that context.
Secondly, it is crucial to note that an economically eﬃcient allocation
need not necessarily be an equitable or sustainable one. Additional analysis
is required to assess the distributional impacts of the allocation recommended
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by the equi-marginal principle. The hydrological impacts of the allocation
need to be assessed in order to assess whether the various demands are
compatible within the existing watershed. Finally, the continued provision
of basic environmental services within the watershed needs to be consid-
ered. In summary, the watershed needs to be double-checked for unforeseen
externalities and for missing markets for watershed services to ensure
that intra- and inter-temporal eﬃciency is achieved and that equity and
sustainability considerations are properly considered.
The methodology can therefore be thought of as two complementary
stages, the first stage to ascertain economically eﬃcient water allocations
and the second stage consisting of a policy impact analysis. The overall
evaluation strategy, applied to the case study of the Kouris watershed in
Cyprus, is shown in Figure 14.1.
3. CASE STUDY
The following study illustrates how the economic watershed appraisal
methodology described above has been implemented in Cyprus. The
Kouris watershed is used as an example of a watershed with multiple water
use conflicts. The valuation process for the sector demands in Cyprus and
the policy implications are described.
3.1 Water Supply in Cyprus
Cyprus is an arid island state situated in the north-eastern Mediterranean
(Figure 14.2) in which renewable freshwater resources are highly con-
strained. The hydrological cycle of Cyprus is characterized by spatial and
temporal scarcity in water quality and quantity. Eighty per cent of the rain-
fall is lost through evapo-transpiration, the remaining 20 per cent can be
considered as the available annual water resources in Cyprus.
A number of diﬀerent water supply investments and interventions have
been made in Cyprus. In addition to surface water dams and groundwater
exploitation, these included recycling, desalination and even evaporation
suppression, cloud seeding and importation of water. The most significant
investments have been those contributing to the Southern Conveyor Project
(SCP). This scheme forms an interconnected water supply system, which
allows the transfer of water resources throughout the southern part of the
island and also to and from the capital, Nicosia. The scheme was designed
to supply water to irrigated agriculture and residential areas, alleviating
the spatial and temporal scarcity of water supplied in the country. The
SCP eﬀectively links all groundwater and surface water sources from the
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Figure 14.1 Overall evaluation strategy applied to the Kouris watershed
in Cyprus
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Diarizos river (near Paphos) in the west to Paralimni (south of Famagusta)
in the East. As a result, the management of the individual catchments
in Cyprus has become of national importance and consequence (World
Bank, 1996).
Currently all aquifers are exploited beyond their safe yield, with the
excess of use over natural recharge estimated to be 40 million m3/annum.
The possibilities for additional exploitation of surface water have been
largely exhausted and this has necessitated the consideration and/or use
of costly unconventional sources such as desalination, recycling and
evaporation suppression.
3.2 Water Demand in Cyprus
The sectoral demand for water is shown in Table 14.1 for the three major
water schemes in Cyprus. It can be seen that approximately 75 per cent of
current water use is in irrigated agriculture. The majority of the remaining
demand involves urban areas, tourism and industrial demands.
There is a distinct seasonality to the demands for water from these water-
consuming sectors. Urban demands are clearly higher in the tourist season,
whilst the demands for agriculture also vary according to the growing
season. Economic growth has averaged 6 per cent over the past 15 years,
driven largely by the annual growth in the tourist sector (up to 10 per cent
per year). There has also been economic growth in the industrial sector.
Under current government plans, the irrigation sector will be expanded in
the coming years, having grown at a rate of 2.2 per cent over the period
1980–92. Coupled with an expected population growth of 0.9 per cent per
year and rapid urbanization, these will place further pressure on water
resources in the years to come.
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Table 14.1 Water consumption in the major water schemes in Cyprus
(in millions m3/annum in 1994)
Water scheme Urban, industry Irrigation Total
and tourism
Southern Conveyor System 42.7 45.9 88.6
Paphos System 4.2 23.2 27.5
Khrysokhou System 0.4 6.3 6.7
Other 8.1 84.5 92.6
Total 55.4 160.0 215.4
Source: adapted from World Bank (1996).
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Price is a significant determinant of water consumption. The consump-
tion of water resources by irrigated agriculture is subsidised up to 70 per cent
of the average unit production costs (World Bank, 1996). Current pricing
strategies in urban areas diﬀer significantly between municipalities, but
generally involve substantial cost recovery.
3.3 Water Balance and Property Rights
Given the spatial and temporal variability of water resources and demands,
the water balance varies from one watershed or water scheme to the next,
and from one year to the other. The scarcity of water resources in Cyprus
is thus characterized by extreme fluctuations over time and space of water
supply and demand. Of the water schemes shown in Table 14.1, the SCP
has the least favourable water balance (World Bank, 1996). The SCP caters
for 40 per cent of the aggregate demand, 80 per cent of all urban demand
and 25 per cent of all agricultural demand. It is the deficit of surface water
flow, which causes the main shortfall. However, given the yearly fluctu-
ations in precipitation and the resultant surface flow, the scarcity and the
severity of the deficit varies from year to year.
The negative water balance is reflective of the interaction of supply and
demand, and the underlying distribution of the right to control resources.
Agriculture is clearly the largest water consumer. Table 14.1 shows that the
major water schemes all have significant irrigation components, and indeed
the primary motivation for the development of some of these projects was
to maintain water supply for expansion of irrigation. The deficits in the
water balance illustrate a conflict in resource management stemming from
an absence of co-ordinated control of water use and the balancing of those
demands with supply in a manner consistent with the underlying hydrology.
The rights to water stem from government control. Non-governmental
schemes consist of many scattered, small individual and communal
schemes, like those using groundwater from the Kiti aquifer and the upper
reaches of the Kouris catchment. The rights to groundwater resources are
largely common property or open access here, despite the provisions of the
1946 Well law.
In addition to these water users, direct diversions from surface water
flows, mainly in the Troodos mountains, including the Kouris catchment,
for use by individuals and communal irrigators, account for 150 million m3
per year of total resource availability. Surface water is also subject to open
access, and farmers have the rights to construct irrigation schemes and use
surface water (World Bank, 1996). Urban water resources are largely sup-
plied by public schemes such as the SCP, but also by localized commissions
from groundwater and surface water schemes.
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In summary, although the government has the responsibility for monitor-
ing and protecting water resources, this responsibility is divided between many
institutions, resulting in a fragmented regulatory framework (Grimeaud,
2001). A brief overview of the institutional and legislative background to
water policy in Cyprus is given in the appendix to this chapter.
3.4 The Kouris Watershed
The current water balance in the SCP and the overdraft of groundwater
resources are indicative conflicts between resource use and the natural con-
straints of water supply that have arisen under the current water management
environment. The current extent of resource use is clearly unsustainable and
there is nothing to guarantee that the benefits or social welfare derived from
water resources are maximized or well distributed under the current pattern
of water demand.
The conflict can be illustrated with the help of the Kouris watershed.
The Kouris watershed covers 300 km2 in the south-west of Cyprus (see
Figure 14.2). The watershed contains storage dams with a total capacity
of 180 million m3 and provides much of the surface water for the SCP.
The largest single storage dam is the Kouris Dam, with a capacity of
115 million m3. The water users within the watershed are many and dis-
parate and their property rights to water vary. In the upper reaches of the
watershed, agricultural users extract groundwater and divert surface
water for irrigation purposes under a common property arrangement.
Downstream, water is diverted to storage dams for distribution to the
main urban centres and to other irrigation schemes via the SCP. In
the lower reaches of the watershed, surface water feeds into the coastal
wetland areas, which provide a habitat for indigenous wildlife and migra-
tory bird species.
It is widely believed that the uncontrolled growth of private and
communal water use in the upper reaches of the Kouris watershed has
contributed to reduced surface flows for the SCP (World Bank, 1996).
Given the inter-basin transfers that the SCP allows, this watershed issue is
of national consequence. Furthermore, the storage dams of the SCP have
reduced the freshwater resources reaching the coast and feeding wetlands.
There is concern that this has caused damage to the habitats important to
migratory species. The management of water resources and conflicts within
the watershed is not co-ordinated and the balance between these dimen-
sions of demand within the Kouris watershed has not been met. There is a
need for a new approach to water management in Cyprus, which takes into
consideration the pertinent contextual factors: (1) imbalance of growing
demand and exhausted/costly supply; (2) growing environmental costs and
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issues of sustainability; (3) watershed-level water management and river
basin districts; and (4) fragmented legal and institutional framework.
In short, the unregulated interplay of water-using agents acting in their
own interests has led to conflicting demands within the watershed. The
management of water resources has not taken a watershed approach, has
been uncoordinated, and the balance between demands within the Kouris
watershed has not been met. As a result the water balance for the SCP is in
deficit and, given the expected sectoral growth, is likely to worsen in the
coming years, whilst environmental impacts go largely unchecked. The
development of conventional water sources has proved insuﬃcient for
securing water resources in the face of extreme climatic conditions and the
options for supply augmentation are nearly exhausted and only available at
high cost. An integrated approach is needed.
4. EVALUATION OF WATER DEMAND IN CYPRUS
4.1 Residential Household Water Demand
An analysis of residential water demand from the SCP was undertaken.
Water demand was calculated from expenditure data and knowledge of the
tariﬀ structure in each of the localities. As in most European countries and
in the USA, Cyprus water utilities choose among three types of pricing
schemes (uniform, decreasing and increasing block rates) in their attempt
to use the price of water as a management tool to influence its use. The
government-controlled part of Cyprus is divided into 37 water authorities,
each having its own tariﬀ structure. The adoption of an increasing block
tariﬀ structure and diﬀerences in the application of this pricing policy
across water authorities give rise to substantial water price heterogeneity on
the island.
Economists have attempted to shed some light on the consequences of
the choice of the pricing structure by paying attention to demand estima-
tion. However, opinions concerning the appropriate methodology for esti-
mating water demand models diﬀer. Estimation under a block pricing
structure requires appropriate modelling to account for the choice of both
within and between block consumption. Earlier studies of water demand
ignore the peculiar features of the presence of block rates and perform
empirical estimation using ex post calculated average prices. More recently,
investigators combine marginal price and the so-called Nordin’s diﬀerence
variable (in the case of multiple tariﬀs, this variable is the diﬀerence
between the total bill and what the users would have paid if all units were
charged at the marginal price) in empirical models of residential demand.
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We estimated a model consistent with fundamental principles of the eco-
nomic theory of consumer behaviour (such as adding-up, price homogen-
eity and symmetry). The choice of the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand
System (QUAIDS) model reflects the fact that it belongs to the family of
rank-3 demand systems, the most general empirical representation of con-
sumer preferences that satisfies integrability. We use a rank-3 demand
system for two reasons. First, we estimate demand for water using individ-
ual household data. Lower rank demand systems are unable to capture the
non-linear income eﬀects pertaining to these data. Second, we need a
demand system that satisfies integrability (that is, the ability to recover
the parameters of the indirect utility function from empirical demand
analysis), because we plan to analyse the welfare implications of alterna-
tive water pricing policies on empirical grounds. We consider the ability to
evaluate the welfare implications of alternative water-pricing policies
particularly important, given the significance attached to equity and the
strong political objections to water price reform in Cyprus based on
political-economic arguments.
The theoretical model described above is applied to individual household
data from the 1996/97 Family Expenditure Survey (FES) of Cyprus. This
allows estimation of the price and income elasticities of residential demand
for water in Cyprus, the marginal value of water in the residential sector
and evaluates the welfare eﬀects associated with changes in the water-
pricing system. Empirical results show that the current water-pricing
system is progressive, but ineﬃcient in the sense that it introduces gross
price distortions resulting in deadweight loss. The regional diﬀerence, in
particular, introduces a substantial price heterogeneity that cannot be
justified on the basis of eﬃciency or equity criteria. It cannot be justified
on eﬃciency grounds, because it is diﬃcult to imagine that on a small island
like Cyprus such large regional diﬀerences in price can reflect diﬀerences in
supply costs. The regional price heterogeneity can also not be justified on
equity grounds, because we found that large water consumers pay a lower
average price per cubic metre than users consuming smaller amounts
of water.
The empirical analysis suggests that the marginal value of water in the
residential sector is £CY0.45/m3. The price elasticity of water demand
ranges between 0.4 for households in the lowest and 0.8 for households
in the highest 10 per cent income distribution (see Table 14.2). This means
that the demand curve for water is downward sloping and highly respon-
sive to price changes for high-income water users. This suggests a strong
role for price as a demand management tool. Budget elasticities for water,
which reflect the responsiveness of the proportion of income spent on water
to income changes, and hence income elasticity of demand (IED), are also
328 Cost–benefit analysis and water resources management
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shown in Table 14.2. The fact that the budget elasticities are always less
than 1 implies that water is, as expected, seen as a necessity. However, the
value increases with income, suggesting that an increase in income for high-
income households leads to a greater increase in the proportion of income
spent on water. This can be explained by the fact that higher-income groups
use more water for water-intensive luxury goods such as swimming pools
and gardens with lawns.
The analysis showed that the existing and regionally defined hetero-
geneous increasing block pricing system introduces gross price distortions
that cannot be justified on the basis of eﬃciency considerations. In the case
of residential water use, price can play a role in a demand management
scheme designed to tackle the growing fresh water problems in Cyprus.
Such an approach, however, should take into account the distributional
impact of alternative price regimes. Any major water price reform is bound
to have eﬀects on the welfare of individual consumers, In other words, there
will be winners and losers, and therefore there will also be a need to con-
sider how to deal with potential hardship caused by the water price reform.
4.2 Agricultural Water Demand
An agricultural production function for groundwater users was estimated
econometrically from which the marginal productivities of the inputs as
well as the eﬀects of each of the inputs on risk could be derived. Risk con-
siderations are necessary in the understanding of the agricultural sector’s
use of water. Public policy should consider not only the marginal contri-
bution of the various inputs to the output, but also the marginal reduction
in the variance of the output.
In the estimated production function, fertilizers, manure and pesticides
(FMP) inputs, as well as water, had a significant and positive eﬀect on
expected profit. These FMP inputs and water exhibit decreasing marginal
returns. Water and FMP and labour and FMP appear to be complimentary
Table 14.2 Estimated price and budget elasticities of household
water demand
Elasticity Income group percentiles
Bottom 10% 11–25% 26–50% 51–75% 76–90% Top 10%
Budget 0.25 0.22 0.23 0.30 0.35 0.48
Price 0.79 0.69 0.60 0.56 0.50 0.39
Source: Hadjispirou et al. (2002).
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inputs. Water and FMP are risk increasing inputs, but at a decreasing rate.
On the contrary, labour appears to decrease the variance of profit at an
increasing rate (see Table 14.3).
Crop-specific production functions are found to be statistically diﬀerent
and have better explanatory power than a general agricultural production
function in the Kiti region. This indicates that crop specific policies will be
more eﬃcient than policies, which do not diﬀerentiate among crops. In
addition, for all crops fertilizers and pesticides exhibit higher marginal
contributions than either water or labour.
Farmers exhibit moderate risk aversion and are willing to pay approxi-
mately one-fifth of their expected profit to achieve a situation in which the
profit received with certainty leaves them as well oﬀ as the uncertain
expected profit. No heterogeneity in risk attitudes is observed across the
farming population, so policies introduced to reallocate risk do not need to
diﬀerentiate between specific types of farmers. This is reasonable given the
fact that the agricultural region under consideration is small and there
exists almost no variation in the accessibility of economic resources,
services and information.
4.3 Environmental Water Demand
As the standards of living increase in Cyprus, so water demand for recre-
ational purposes also increases. Furthermore, water may have a use value,
but also a non-use or existence value. People who are willing to pay for
water and wildlife preservation can be local residents who live near a
wetland, for example, but also people who care about its preservation and
live far away from it. In a separate study, the willingness to pay (WTP) for
Table 14.3 Estimated risk premiums and marginal input productivity
Parameter Water Fertilizer Labour
Average risk premium 18 19 17
(% of expected profit)
Impact on variance of Positive and Positive and Negative and 
profit (other decreasing decreasing decreasing
inputs constant)
Marginal Citrus Veg Cereal Citrus Veg Cereal Citrus Veg Cereal
productivity 0.59 0.21 0.14 0.72 0.55 — 0.17 0.32 0.25
by crop (CY£)
Source: Groom et al. (2002).
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environmental goods that are dependent upon freshwater resources, that is,
wetland ecosystems, which provide an important habitat for migratory bird
species in Cyprus, was estimated.
Possible non-use values were estimated using the contingent valuation
(CV) methodology in the context of water provision for migratory bird
species (Swanson et al., 2001). The valuation scenario used was a real one:
without regional co-operation, a migratory bird species, which uses wet-
lands in Cyprus and the UK as a habitat and migratory stepping stone,
the white-headed duck, will be threatened with extinction. Those sur-
veyed were asked to express their preferences for the provision of water to
endangered species under co-operative and non-cooperative funding sce-
narios. Econometric analysis of the survey responses demonstrated that
there exists a positive WTP for the provision of local water to the endan-
gered species of £10 per household per year. It is further demonstrated
that there is an increased WTP of £10 plus an extra £5 per household per
year for the local allocation of water to the endangered species if other
states along the migratory route make similar choices (the co-operative
scenario).
4.4 Optimal Groundwater Management
This study looks at the particular issues of optimal groundwater man-
agement and the allocation of groundwater between competing agricul-
tural and residential demands. Optimal allocation of groundwater is a
multi-stage decision process. At each stage, for example, each year, a deci-
sion must be made regarding the level of groundwater use, which will
maximize the present value of economic returns to the basin. The initial
conditions for each stage may be diﬀerent due to changes in either the
economic or hydrologic parameters of the basin under consideration.
However, in most of the dynamic models employed in the groundwater lit-
erature the resource is modelled as a stock to be depleted in a mining era
before moving to a stationary state era. Implicit in these models are the
assumptions of fixed economic relations and/or exogenous rates of
change through time.
More complex and realistic representations of increasing resource
scarcity incorporate opportunities for adaptation to rising resource prices.
That is, in the long run, shifts away from water intensive production activ-
ities, adoption of new techniques or backstop technologies, substitution of
alternative inputs, and production of a diﬀerent mix of products oﬀer
rational responses to increasing scarcity. To model these, economists have
developed the technique of multi-stage optimal control in the context of
groundwater mining for agricultural production. Our study employs this
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technique to describe the chronological pattern of groundwater use by
diﬀerent economic sectors (residential and agriculture) in order to define
the optimal quantity of the resource that should be produced when the
available backstop technology (that is, seawater desalination) is adopted at
some endogenously defined time. Included in a control model this type of
adaptation strengthens its ability to describe economic processes associated
with natural resource depletion. The additional information can further
inform public policy decisions concerning natural resource allocation
among economic sectors, optimal timing of adoption of an available back-
stop technology and definition of the optimal quantity of the resource to
be produced by this technology for each of the diﬀerent users.
Moreover, our model takes into account common property arrange-
ments for groundwater resources that lead to dynamic externalities in
consumption. These externalities are associated with the finite nature of the
resource, pumping costs and the use of groundwater as a buﬀer against risk.
Our study focuses upon the common use of the Kiti aquifer and addresses
the scarcity rents generated by agricultural and residential demand for
groundwater. The optimal allocation between agricultural and residential
sectors is simulated based on hydrological parameters and the correspond-
ing optimal unit scarcity rents are calculated. The optimal scarcity rents are
compared to those that emerge under the simulated myopic common prop-
erty arrangement, the diﬀerence reflecting the common property externality,
allowing us to assess the benefits from optimal groundwater management,
through, for example, more adequate and incentive groundwater pricing.
Our results suggest that in the presence of a backstop technology the
eﬀect of the dynamic externality in groundwater consumption is not par-
ticularly strong on the social welfare of the economic sectors using ground-
water. This is an intuitive result, because it suggests that when the scarcity
of the resource is reduced due to the presence of a backstop technology,
welfare gains from controlling resource extraction are not significant for
any practical purposes. However, in the absence of a backstop technology
and continuous natural recharge, the eﬀect on welfare from managing
groundwater extraction is significant. A huge welfare improvement is
derived from controlling extraction as compared to myopic exploitation of
the aquifer (see Table 14.4).
Finally, an alternative methodology, the distance function approach, is
employed to estimate the scarcity rents of the Kiti groundwater using more
applicable behavioural assumptions for agricultural firms. Distance func-
tions have a number of virtues, which make their use attractive when the
environment under which firms operate is regulated and/or firms are
ineﬃcient due to a lack of incentives faced by their operators. In particu-
lar, the first virtue of distance functions is that they do not necessarily
332 Cost–benefit analysis and water resources management
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require price data to compute the parameters. Only quantity data is needed.
Secondly, distance functions do not impose any behavioural hypothesis
(such as profit maximization or cost minimization). They allow production
units to operate below the production frontier (that is, to be ineﬃcient) and
they also allow derivation of firm-specific ineﬃciencies. Thirdly, duality
results between distance functions and the more conventional cost, profit
and revenue functions provide flexibility for empirical applications.
The key extension of this research compared with existing theoretical
literature is that, if cost, profit or revenue function representations are pre-
cluded, the restricted distance function provides an excellent analytical tool
for estimating unobservable shadow prices of in situ natural resources
(produced and used as inputs in production processes of vertically inte-
grated firms). The data used in this research were based on the Production
Surveys conducted by Koundouri and Xepapadeas (2003; 2004) for the
years 1991, 1997 and 1999. Our analysis focuses on a sample of 228 agri-
cultural farmers located in the Kiti region. The data set consists of a bal-
anced panel composed of the same 76 farmers over the three years of the
survey. Estimation suggests that firm specific eﬃciencies are increasing over
time. The average technical eﬃciency for agricultural firms in the sample
increased rather rapidly from 0.47 in 1991 to 0.78 in 1997 and finally to 0.94
in 1999, where a coeﬃcient of 1.0 would represent a firm at the frontier of
eﬃciency.
The reported increases in the technical eﬃciency of agricultural firms
can be attributed to the major restructuring of the agricultural sector in the
last decade in an attempt to harmonize the Cypriot agricultural policies
with those of the European Union (EU) in the light of Cyprus accession in
the EU. Alternatively, increases may indicate the existence of technological
progress in the agricultural sector, which is not accounted for in our empir-
ical model (which assumes constant technological change). These are the
Table 14.4 Welfare and welfare improvement under the optimal control
and common property regime
Regime Backstop Welfare Welfare 
improvement
Optimal control Available £170.360 m
Myopic Available £162.621 m 3.8%
Optimal control Not available £110.510 m
Myopic Not available £25.9610 m 409.4%
Source: Koundouri (2000).
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first estimates of the eﬃciency of the Cypriot agricultural sector and, as a
result, there is no scope for comparison at present. The key outcome of this
empirical application, however, is that estimated technical firm specific
ineﬃciencies present in agricultural production technologies, suggest that
cost minimization is not the relevant behaviour objective in irrigated agri-
culture in Cyprus. This result provides support for the use of the distance
function approach to derive resource scarcity rents.
The unit scarcity rent of in situ groundwater estimated by the distance
function is approximately equal to zero (0.0097 CY£/m3) under the myopic
common property scheme (Table 14.5). This is approximately 20 times less
than the same value under optimal control. This comparison indicates that
agricultural producers in the region are not paying the full social cost for
groundwater extraction. This implies that under common property, exter-
nalities arise as current users of the resource are only paying the private cost
of their resource extraction. As a result, the resource’s scarcity value
remains unrecognized (Koundouri, 2003). This pattern of behaviour is con-
sistent with perfect myopic resource extraction, which arises because of the
absence of properly allocated property rights in groundwater and is con-
sistent with the results found in a study on WTP for groundwater quality.
A hedonic analysis of WTP for improvements in groundwater quality
was also undertaken. Groundwater quality may aﬀect the productivity of
land used for cultivating crops. Where this is so, the structure of land rents
and prices are expected to reflect these environmentally determined pro-
ductivity diﬀerentials. Hence, by using the collected data on land rent or
value for diﬀerent properties, we tried to identify the contribution of fresh
groundwater quality to the price of land and therefore WTP for ground-
water quality.
Based on this approach, the estimated marginal value of groundwater
quality as far as reduced salination is concerned is statistically insignificant
and equal to £CY1.07 per hectare of land (Koundouri and Pashardes, 2002).
Table 14.5 Resource rents under the optimal control and common property
regime
Component of social cost Optimal control Common property 
(£Cy/m3) (£Cy/m3)
Groundwater pumping cost 0.31 0.31
Scarcity rent/marginal user cost 0.20 0.0097
Marginal social cost of groundwater 0.5* 0.32
Notes: * Cost of the backstop technology desalination.
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The statistically insignificant small marginal WTP for improvements in
groundwater quality may imply that groundwater extraction is myopic, for
instance, because of free-riding. This is expected to be an artefact of the
non-existence of properly allocated property rights in a common-pool
aquifer.
Another explanatory factor for the low marginal WTP for groundwater
quality may be a substitution eﬀect of farmers changing their land use to
the more lucrative tourism industry. Tourism utilizes other existing water
sources than groundwater.
5. BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
OF AN OPTIMAL WATER ALLOCATION
AND THE CORRESPONDING POLICY IMPACTS
An optimal allocation of scarce water resources in Cyprus requires a
careful balancing of the various values of water within the catchment area.
In Cyprus, the preferred method for implementing the optimal allocation
was through the development of a uniform water-pricing scheme where
each water user is charged the same price. Hence, water pricing for resi-
dential, agricultural and environmental uses was taken into consideration
and based on the marginal social cost of water supply. The marginal
social cost of water supply was estimated at £CY0.45/m3 by the Water
Development Department in Cyprus, using the average incremental cost
methodology and reflecting the long-run marginal cost of water provision
based on the national resources required for its provision. The marginal
social cost of water equals the opportunity cost of providing additional
water for diﬀerent purposes in Cyprus rather than providing other socially
demanded goods and services (such as health services or education ser-
vices) on the island. The marginal social cost of water provided to the
charged residential and industrial sectors should also reflect the opportun-
ity costs of losing water to the uncharged (public good) sector. The analy-
sis of the value attached by the public to water allocation for the
preservation of wetlands as a habitat and stepping stone for endangered
migratory bird species has demonstrated that there exists a positive WTP
for these non-priced and water-dependent environmental resources. The
marginal social cost of water charged to residential and industrial sectors
should in fact reflect the costs of all opportunities forgone as a result of a
specific allocation of water.
However, there may also be other important factors, which have to be
taken into consideration under this optimal allocation, such as equity (the
impacts on lower income groups), risk (the impacts on variability) and
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hydrology (the impacts on conjoint users). The household demand study
showed that the current increasing block pricing system introduces price
distortions, which cannot be justified, either on eﬃciency or equity
grounds. In terms of eﬃciency the current tariﬀ system cannot be justified,
because the same water resource supplies all locations at similar marginal
social costs. Since large water consumers pay a lower average price than
small water consumers, the current tariﬀ system can also not be justified on
equity grounds. Although a shift towards a uniform marginal cost pricing
system will eliminate the deadweight loss of the current system, its benefits
will be distributed in favour of the better oﬀ households. As such the water-
pricing policy can be considered inequitable. The impact of water avail-
ability on the variance in producer profitability was also analysed, showing
how the current and an alternative water allocation aﬀects the welfare of
risk-averse agents. We discovered that water has a positive, but decreasing
eﬀect on the variance of profit. Other things remaining equal, this implies
that although additional water use increases the output and profit on
average (that is, positive marginal productivity), it simultaneously increases
the risk associated with the produced output. The analysis shows that the
population is risk averse, and therefore additional water use may be welfare
reducing.
An important concern was furthermore related to a possible reduction
of agricultural subsidies and the expected impact that this may have on
employment. However, the estimated production function showed no
significant complementarity between labour and water input, indicating
that a change in water use will not have any eﬀect on current employment
in the agricultural sector.
The logic behind treating the watershed as the most appropriate
management unit is that the interactions of the physical elements of hydrol-
ogy and geo-hydrology and water demand can be addressed in a coherent
way and can guide policy. However, thus far the interdependent nature of
surface water and groundwater, and the wider impacts that demand for one
of these resources has upon the other, has been largely ignored in our study.
Any policy impact analysis should consider the interdependency between
and conjoint use of groundwater and surface and their mutual impacts.
Excessive groundwater pumping reduces, for example, surface water flows
downstream and hence the available water for the sectors located there. On
the other hand, groundwater pumping may contribute to surface water
flows through return flows, increasing the importance of the timing of
resource flows. Seasonal pricing could be used to ensure water availability
to downstream users in line with their seasonal preferences.
Finally, the proposed allocation of water needs to be backed up by legis-
lative change. Water legislation in Cyprus is characterized by a piecemeal
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approach (see the appendix to this chapter). The quality of freshwater
resources is dealt with in several laws, depending on resource type and
specific water use. Moreover, both water quality and water quantity aspects
are dealt with through several diﬀerent instruments, in particular in the case
of groundwater. A more integrative approach is expected in the near future
as a result of the implementation of the European WFD.
In sum, the foregoing has provided an example of how CBA of water
policy can be structured in the context of the much discussed hydrological
unit: the watershed. The methodology and case study combine to show how
the constraints faced by watershed managers and policy-makers can be use-
fully evaluated and traded oﬀ using the principles of CBA and how, using
economic analysis in conjunction with legal and hydrological backdrop,
important considerations or environment and equity can be incorporated
into the policy-making process.
APPENDIX
Brief Overview of the Institutional and Legislative Background to Water
Policy in Cyprus
Generally speaking, the institutional arrangement to protect freshwater
resources in Cyprus is characterized by a fragmented, piecemeal approach,
involving the Council of Ministers, the Water Development Department of
the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment, the
Department of Labour of the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance
and the Medical and Public Health Services Division of the Ministry of
Health (Grimeaud, 2001).
Water legislation in Cyprus has three main components:
1. Legislation on the protection of freshwater resources surface and ground-
water. The 1991 Control of Water Pollution Law [69/91]. Regulations
include: 1992 and 1995 Regulations on Application for a Licence relat-
ing to Waste Disposal; the 1993 Regulation on the Prohibition of
Discharges; the 1996 Order on Measures for the Protection of
Underground Waters and a Code of Good Agricultural Practice.
2. Specific legislation on groundwater. The 1928 Government Waterworks
Law and the 1946 Wells law. This arranges, inter alia, that groundwater
which has not yet been subject to abstraction and exploitation [as well
as waste water] falls under state propriety.
3. Legislation on water supply. This aims at maintaining an appropriate
level of water quantity in certain sensitive aquifer areas and at providing
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consumers with tap water in suﬃcient quantity. There are three main
pieces of legislation: (a) 1955 Water Development and Distribution
Law, (b) 1964 Water Supply law and (c) 1951 Water Supply law.
The implementation of legislation concerning the protection of water
resources is the responsibility of two diﬀerent ministries. The Ministry of
Agriculture, Natural Resources and the Environment sets Environmental
Quality Standards, grants permits for discharges and enforces all provi-
sions related to pollution from industrial sources, while the Ministry of
Labour and Social Insurance is in charge of monitoring and compliance
with permit conditions. Legislation regarding water supply is implemented
by Water Development Committees, which are established to promote the
conservation of water resources, to develop the use of those resources and
to co-ordinate water supply distribution. Moreover, they may also regulate
the use of water and prevent waste discharges. The Council of Ministers
designates water shortage areas for which permits have to be obtained prior
to the construction of wells or the exploitation of surface water.
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